The ICIOT2021 conferencewas organized to promote researchĪnd application innovations around the world. We indeed need creative thinking, long-term visions, and innovative methodologies to People, and virtual Internet spaces.Theway of building newIoT applications is changing. Visualization, analysis, and integration engines and other components of traditional IoTĪre interconnected through innovative services to realize the value of connected things, Sensing devices wired and wireless networks platforms and tools data processing, Is termed Internet of Things Services (IoTS). Traditional device-centric Internet of Things (IoT) is now moving into a new era which With the rapid advancements of mobile Internet, cloud computing, and big data, the Virtual Event, December 10–14, 2021 Proceedings
We set forth a research agenda by examining zero trust through the lens of several organisational theories and propose a number of research propositions.Ħth International Conference, Held as Part of the Services Conference Federation, SCF 2021 In this paper, we map zero trust concepts to the supply chain, and discuss the steps an organisation might take to transition to zero trust. In contrast to perimeter-based security, which attempts to keep adversarial actors out, a zero trust-based security posture assumes that adversaries are already inside the system, and therefore imposes strict access and authentication requirements. Originating in the field of information technology and cybersecurity, a zero trust philosophy assumes that all actors and activity are untrusted. In this paper, we propose the concept of the zero trust supply chain. However, increased trust may actually expose the supply chain to more risk, not less. Trust between supply chain partners is commonly thought to be a risk management tool, where increasing trust results in reduced risk. Such supply chain attacks are increasing in frequency and their impacts can be costly to an organisation. The modern supply chain is characterised by an ill-defined and porous perimeter, allowing entry points for potential adversaries to intercept sensitive information and disrupt operations. We conclude with possible lessons that algorithmic finance can teach to markets deploying algorithmic contracting. Analyzing the findings through the lens of new institutional economics, we explain how widespread adoption of contract automation can put pressure on institutions to change. Using algorithmic trading in financial markets as an example, we show how the automation of finance has brought about institutional changes in the form of new regulation to hedge against systemic risks from inflexibility. This illuminates the need to address the inflexibility of contracting algorithms in a nuanced manner, distinguishing between inflexibility as a potentially beneficial constraint on the level of transactions, and inflexibility as a set of systemic risks and changes arising in markets employing inflexible contracting algorithms.
Drawing on rational choice theory, we explain why inflexibility, when seen as a constraint, can ultimately not only enhance welfare but also enable cooperation on algorithmic markets. An important part of the criticism raised against the adoption of advanced contract automation relates to the inflexibility of automated contracts.